Koizumi's gamble and its consequences by unknown
When Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called for snap elections to occur
in September 2005 to push forward his postal privatization agenda, the opposition,
the public and even some of his colleagues were quick to dismiss his so-called irra-
tional move. With only a year left until his retirement, why would the lame-duck
Prime Minister hustle this much to shake up the entire political system just for one
policy agenda? With resounding results, Koizumi accomplished something many
in Japan and overseas political observers didn’t think he could do: he managed 
to usher in a new political era for his Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese
political system through this historic election.
With details for the privatization of the postal system still very unclear, no one knows
how this vast pool of funds will affect the financial system. Will the release of 
government control over postal savings and life insurance deposits shake up the
stock and bond markets? How and why did postal privatization become Koizumi’s
ideological agenda? What does this election mean for the LDP? What mistakes did
the opposition party make? 
To shed some light on the current political landscape in Japan, Columbia University
Burgess Professor of Political Science Gerald Curtis spoke to a packed audience
on September 20, 2005. He was joined by David Weinstein, Carl S. Shoup Professor
of Japanese Economy and Associate Director for Research at the Center on Japanese
Economy and Business (CJEB) and Hugh Patrick, Director, CJEB.
This report highlights Professor Curtis’ speech and following discussions with
audience members. The program was cosponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian
Institute of Columbia University. 
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DAVID WEINSTEIN 
Carl S. Shoup Professor of the
Japanese Economy, Columbia
University; Associate Director for
Research, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business,
Columbia Business School
Iam honored to be here toshare the podium with such
distinguished speakers and 
colleagues. Gerry Curtis is a
person who does not need an
introduction, but in case there
is someone in the audience
who hasn’t been paying atten-
tion to Japan for the last four
decades, I will say a few words.
Gerry is the most eminent
political scientist working on
Japan. His book Election Cam-
paigning Japanese Style became
a best-seller in Japan. I think
one signature feature of Gerry’s
career is that he not only teaches
Westerners so much about
Japanese politics, but Japanese
political scientists also learn an
enormous amount from him. 
His book The Japanese 
Way of Politics won the Ohira
Memorial Prize, and last year
Gerry was given the Award of
the Rising Sun Gold and Silver
Star by the Emperor. In addi-
tion, Gerry writes a column for
several Japanese newspapers
and serves as an adviser to
Newsweek magazine. 
For the students in the audi-
ence, in case some of you are
wondering how Gerry became
so eminent, I need only remind
you that he received his Ph.D.
from Columbia and has stayed
here ever since. So, a word to
the wise is sufficient. 
In a fascinating turn of
events, Japanese politics seems
to be moving more toward 
the battle of ideas and, most
recently, toward the battle of
factions. But rather than listen
to my take on it, I’ll turn the
floor over to Gerry. 
GERALD CURTIS
Burgess Professor of Political
Science, Columbia University
Iam delighted to see so manypeople here today. This is a
really big turnout for a lecture
about a Japanese election, but
this was truly one of the most
interesting, entertaining, and
important elections in Japanese
history. 
The trigger for the election
was the Diet’s rejection of a
government bill to privatize
Japan’s postal system. The bill
only barely passed the Lower
House when nearly forty
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
members voted against it. It
was defeated in the Upper
House when a large number 
of LDP members decided to
vote against it. Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi immediately
dissolved the Lower House,
saying that he wanted the 
public to indicate whether it
supported his policy on the
reform of the postal system or
agreed with those who were
opposed to it.
Koizumi’s strategy was to
frame the election as a referen-
dum on postal system reform.
He drove all of the LDP mem-
bers who had voted against his
bill in the Lower House out of
the party and ran new candi-
dates against them, including
several high-profile women.
The media quickly labeled
these new candidates the
“assassins,” thus bringing a
sense of high drama to the
election and getting the public
excited about it. The result was
a nearly 8-percentage spike
upward in the voting rate.
Koizumi managed to portray
the LDP, which for the previous
four years had resisted much 
of his program, as the party of
reform, and the Democratic
Party (DPJ), which had been
founded several years earlier 
to pursue a reform agenda, as 
a party opposed to change. 
There is little evidence that
the public knew what to make
of the details of the postal
reform bill. What attracted them
was the courage of a Prime
Minister who was willing to risk
losing power rather than give
up a policy that he believed
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was essential for Japan’s eco-
nomic revitalization. Koizumi
convinced the voters that he
had the conviction of his beliefs
and would rather leave office
than betray those beliefs. 
His strategy succeeded bril-
liantly. A prime minister, who
until just a few weeks earlier
looked as though his popularity
was ebbing and whose ability
to survive in office until the
end of his term as LDP President
in September 2006 was being
publicly questioned, now sud-
denly enjoyed a huge upswing
in popularity. His party swept
the election, increasing its rep-
resentation in the 480-member
Lower House by 84 seats for a
total of 296 seats. Together with
its coalition partner, the Komeito,
which won 31 seats, it controls
two-thirds of the Lower House.
That means that it has the num-
bers to pass legislation defeated
in the Upper House.
The opposition DPJ suffered
a humiliating defeat. It won
only 113 seats, a loss of 64. Of
the 31 purged LDP incumbents,
most of whom ran as inde-
pendents, only 15 won. They
also remain outside the party
and isolated. With the adoption
of a predominantly single-
member district system a
decade ago, small parties such
as the once powerful Socialist
Party (renamed the Social
Democratic Party) and the
Communist Party have fared
poorly. Neither was able to
break out of the single digits 
in terms of seats won. 
To explain a little about the
results, the first point to stress
is that this election was not
won by the LDP. It was won by
Prime Minister Koizumi; nearly
300 LDP candidates rode into
office on his broad coattails.
Koizumi is in a league of his
own when it comes to political
skill and media savvy. He has
often said that he would
destroy the LDP if it did not
support reform, but in fact he 
is not destroying it but saving 
it from itself. 
Koizumi is often compared
to Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher because of his emphasis
on shrinking the government’s
role in the economy, but the
more apt comparison is to Tony
Blair. Reagan and Thatcher 
succeeded in convincing the
public to support positions
long identified with their par-
ties. Koizumi, like Blair, forced
his own party to embrace poli-
cies they had long resisted and
then got the public to support
the party because of its new
stance. Koizumi has not yet
succeeded in creating a “New
LDP” in the way Blair created
New Labour, but he has created
the possibility that he will do so.
The phenomenon of a
“Koizumi boom” driving up
public support for his party is
not without precedent. A little
more than a decade ago, there
was a Hosokawa boom that
propelled Morihiro Hosokawa
into the Prime Minister’s office.
In the 1970s, the current
Speaker of the Lower House,
Yohei Kono, who had split
from the LDP to form the New
Liberal Club, enjoyed a similar
outpouring of public support.
Every decade or so, a politician
appears who seems to capture
the imagination of the Japanese
public. 
The difference this time is
that the object of the boom was
the Prime Minister, rather than
an opposition party leader and,
most importantly, that it was
the first such boom to occur in
the context of Japan’s predomi-
nantly single-member district
system. Such a system magni-
fies the effects of a leader
boom, sweeping members of
the leader’s party to victory
across the country. 
The size of the LDP victory
was unexpected, even to the
party’s leaders. In Tokyo, for
example, it won every single-
member district seat except for
one and won so many seats in
the proportional representation
contest that it did not have
enough candidates to fill all the
seats it won, causing it to forfeit
one seat to the Socialists.
Koizumi’s appeal since he
was first elected Prime Minister
in 2001 is rooted in his innate
optimism. Japanese politicians
tend to warn about how bad
things will get if people don’t
try hard to avoid calamity.
When times are good, people
may be responsive to a politi-
cian who warns that good
times do not last forever. But
when a country has been in the
economic doldrums for more
The first point to
stress is that this
election was not
won by the LDP. 
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than a decade, the last thing
the public wants is to hear a
politician tell them how much
worse things are likely to get
unless they take power.
Koizumi’s message was simple
and straightforward. Privatizing
the postal system and reducing
government interference with
the operation of the marketplace
will energize the Japanese
economy. Make these changes,
he told the voters, and things
will get better.
The opposition DPJ took 
a more traditional Japanese
approach. Its slogan was, “We
are not giving up on Japan,”
hardly a message to inspire
hope, and it warned how 
terrible things would become
unless something was done
about fiscal deficits and pen-
sion reform. What it neglected
to do was tell the public why
the DPJ’s coming to power
would make life better.
Koizumi’s great strength
going into this election was 
that he was not afraid to lose.
Koizumi was not confident 
that he would win the election
when he decided to dissolve
the House. What he knew was
that if he did not call elections,
he would spend his remaining
months in office unable to
accomplish anything the LDP
party bosses opposed. He 
concluded that if he won the
election, he would gain new
momentum, and if he lost, he
would take the LDP down 
with him. LDP politicians who
opposed him on postal reform
and thought that he would
accept some kind of compro-
mise simply failed to take the
full measure of the man.
They also failed to under-
stand that Koizumi has total
confidence in his instincts. He
has limited patience for chew-
ing over issues, which often
turns out to be more of a weak-
ness rather than a strength.
Once he has made up his mind
on a course of action, he also
does not look back or waver.
He simply refuses to abide by
the informal rules that have
long constrained LDP leader-
ship behavior. Consequently,
he constantly caught other
politicians by surprise and
threw them on the defensive
while delighting the public 
with his willingness to challenge
the LDP from within.
Three other factors deserve
mention as having contributed
to Koizumi’s victory in this
election. One is the improve-
ment in Japan’s economic
performance. Fears about a
crash of the country’s financial
system are now history. The
banks have written off an 
enormous amount of bad loans
and are now beginning to lend
again. Corporate profits are 
setting new records, the stock
market is up, exports have
been driving growth, and con-
sumer and business confidence
has improved. The sense that
the worst is behind Japan and
that the economy is on a path
to sustained growth clearly 
provided a backdrop for an
election that was favorable to
Koizumi.
Another important factor
was the ineptitude of the DPJ
campaign. The DPJ made a
strategic mistake by not putting
forward an alternative to
Koizumi’s postal privatization
bill. Party leaders assumed that
there would not be an election
before he left office and thus
put more emphasis on main-
taining harmony among the
diverse interests represented 
in the party than broadcasting
an appealing message to the
public. Koizumi thus was able
to portray the DPJ as being
against change as much as
those in the LDP were. The 
DPJ never got off the defensive
and was unable to convince the
voters that they should consider
the election as anything other
than a referendum on postal
reform. They did everything
possible to deserve the fate 
the election results bestowed
on them.
Finally and perhaps most
crucially, Koizumi won because
Japan is changing, not vice
versa. The 1990s was not a 
so-called lost decade for Japan;
it was a watershed decade 
in terms of changing values,
expectations, attitudes, and
behavior. The political machine
is collapsing, even in rural
areas. Faith in the bureau-
cracy’s ability to guide the
economy disappeared with 
the bursting of the bubble
economy. The idea that things
will somehow be okay as long
The DPJ made a
strategic mistake 
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as people do not rock the 
boat is no longer accepted.
Someone like Koizumi could
become Prime Minister in the
first decade of the twenty-first
century only because of what
had happened to Japanese
society in the last decade of 
the twentieth century.
The election results ensure
that postal system reform legis-
lation will be passed by the
Diet very quickly. Those LDP
members who opposed it in
the Upper House have lost no
time to declare their readiness
to support it when it is submit-
ted again. Koizumi probably
could get a stronger bill passed
than the watered-down one 
he submitted in August, but 
he is going to submit exactly
the same legislation that was
defeated earlier. 
Koizumi framed the election
as a referendum on postal
reform. He did not say what 
he would do after reform 
legislation is passed, except to
indicate in vague terms that he
would pursue further economic
reform. Therefore, there is still
a lot of guesswork involved 
in forecasting what he will do
after the postal reform legisla-
tion is passed.
Some things seem clear. 
He will focus his attention on
continuing to try to shrink the
government by dismantling
special agencies, especially the
large number of government
financial institutions. His goal 
is to reduce the power of the
bureaucracy and to eliminate
sinecures for retiring bureau-
crats to make the economy
more responsive to market
forces. He will pursue further
cutbacks on public works
spending and look for other
ways to cut costs. He will not
raise the consumption tax before
his term in office expires next
September. He will push for a
bipartisan consensus on pension
and medical system reform, 
but it is unlikely that agreement
will be reached before his term
expires. He will try to push
through legislation that will
turn over tax-making authority
to local governments and
reduce the power of the central
government, though here, too,
the devil is in the details.
Now that his party has
scored such big successes in
urban Japan, Koizumi has the
opportunity to champion the
cause of agricultural reform.
Japanese agriculture is charac-
terized by elderly people
inefficiently farming small plots
protected by high tariffs. There
is a growing public discussion
in Japan about the need for
fundamental reform, but Prime
Minister Koizumi has not yet
given any indication that he
plans to take on this very big
issue.
Koizumi faces the political
problem of moving the reform
process forward to respond to
the high expectations the pub-
lic expressed in the election.
Having won so big, he now 
has to figure out how to not
disappoint the voters.
As far as the economy is
concerned, what Koizumi does
is probably not as important 
as the mood his victory has cre-
ated. First, there is confidence
in the investor community, 
and especially among foreign
investors, that there will be no
backtracking on the course of
reform. Second, the Japanese
public is generally upbeat
about the Koizumi administra-
tion and the future of the
economy. There is an expecta-
tion that things will get better,
and that in itself creates a virtu-
ous cycle of positive
expectations, conducive to an
increase in consumer spending
and business investing. The
sharp rise in the stock market
since the election is an indicator
of this positive mood.
The longer-term political
consequences of the election
are less certain, but it is my
view that this election, contrary
to appearances, has moved
Japan further along the road to
the creation of a competitive,
two-party-dominated political
party system.
It is very questionable how
strong the LDP will be without
Koizumi. What this election
showed is that the great major-
ity of Japanese voters do not
identify strongly with any polit-
ical party; they are floating
voters who were attracted to
Koizumi’s party at this time. 
It is hard to imagine that they
will support the LDP in as 
large numbers as they did after
Koizumi is gone. The LDP will
Having won so big,
he now has to 
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lose seats in the next election.
The question is, how many.
The DPJ’s massive defeat
was good medicine for the
party. If it had lost by a smaller
margin, the pressure to rejuve-
nate the leadership, to reject
the influence of public sector
unions (which were responsi-
ble for the DPJ’s opposition to
the privatization of the postal
system), and to change its 
strategy would have been
insufficient. But this election
taught the DPJ important les-
sons. One is that it cannot
expect to come to power sim-
ply by waiting for the LDP to
lose it. It has to aggressively,
proactively fight for the voters’
support. The second is that
elections are one-time events.
The DPJ has talked about
building its support over a
number of elections so that 
it would “hop, skip, and then
jump” into power, but it
hopped, skipped, and fell flat
on its face. The result is that 
it now has a new and young
leadership core that is trying 
to change the party to make it 
a real alternative to the LDP. 
One should not underestimate
the ability of the political 
opposition in Japan to betray
expectations that it will chal-
lenge the LDP for power, but 
I believe the coming years 
will be a period of intense and
healthy political competition.
What is particularly noteworthy
is that the DPJ opposes the LDP
on a number of important pol-
icy issues, both in domestic and
foreign affairs, but that these
two parties share essentially the
same ideological space. There
is a fundamental, bipartisan
consensus on basic foreign 
policy, which is anchored in a
close alliance with the United
States and on the need to
reduce the role of the state in
the economy and to make it
more open.
There is a need to be 
cautious in interpreting the sig-
nificance of this election. It
was, after all, a one-off event,
unlikely ever to be repeated. It
was a referendum on a single
issue: postal reform. This is not
likely to happen again. Thirty-
seven incumbent Diet members
were purged from the LDP. 
LDP Diet members will think
harder about going against
party discipline the next time 
a controversial piece of legisla-
tion comes to the Diet. The
LDP swept urban Japan
because of the popularity of 
its leader. But the LDP has not
been transformed, at least not
yet, into an urban party. 
What can be safely con-
cluded about this election is
that politics cannot go back 
to what they were like before
Koizumi. He has irreversibly
broken the old system. Factions
will never again recover the
role they formerly enjoyed in
deciding who becomes Prime
Minister and who joins his
Cabinet. Koizumi has made the
Cabinet the Prime Minister’s
Cabinet, not the LDP’s Cabinet,
and that is likely to continue.
The center of gravity for policy
making has shifted from being
centered in an LDP-bureaucracy
alliance to the Prime Minister’s
office. These are fundamental
and important changes that 
are likely to outlast Koizumi
and that probably will be his
biggest legacy. 
Koizumi, however, has
done more to destroy the old
system than define the contours
of the new one. That will be up
to his successors. One political
issue Japan now confronts is
how to institutionalize a new
system of checks and balances,
something that is necessary to
every democracy. In the past,
either the LDP’s factional system
or an ideological opposition
acted as a brake on the govern-
ing party. However, now that
Koizumi has made the LDP a
more unified party than ever
before, the old factional system
no longer works. The opposi-
tion has been humbled and
weakened by the election, 
so its ability to act as a strong
check on the ruling party is, 
at least for now, quite limited.
There are two sources of
checks and balances operating
at the current time. One is the
Komeito, the LDP’s coalition
partner. The Komeito’s support
is crucial for the LDP, because 
it needs the Komeito’s votes 
to get legislation through the
Upper House and because the
Komeito’s supporting religious
organization, Soka Gakkai, is
one of the few organizations
capable of mobilizing large
Politics cannot go
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numbers of voters in support 
of LDP candidates. This will
become much more important
in the post-Koizumi era.
The second source of con-
straint on the government is 
the stance adopted by Prime
Minister Koizumi himself.
Koizumi has been very careful
to emphasize that the election
gave him a mandate for one
thing and one thing only: to
pass postal system reform legis-
lation and other related reform
measures. Much to his credit,
he has not claimed public sup-
port for anything else, whether
it’s domestic or foreign policy.
And he has insisted that he will
resign when his term as LDP
President ends in September
2006. This means that his
administration must concentrate
on accomplishing the reform
goals he has set out and mak-
ing reform the key issue when
choosing a successor. Koizumi
is no doubt sincere about 
his intention to resign next
September. Given his character,
he will not remain and will sim-
ply help the LDP win the next
Upper House elections in the
summer of 2007. But if he is
convinced that there is impor-
tant, unfinished business that
only he can successfully
resolve, he may in the end
change his mind. 
Recent developments in
domestic Japanese politics
should be welcomed by the
United States. They contribute
directly to strengthening our
bilateral relationship. Koizumi’s
re-election means that there
will be continuity in Japanese
policy and a continued commit-
ment to sustaining a strong
alliance with the United States,
as well as a strong relationship
of trust with President George
W. Bush. The DPJ is also on 
the same page as the LDP in 
its belief of the importance of 
a strong U.S. alliance, creating 
a bipartisan consensus on the
fundamental underpinnings of
Japanese foreign policy.
The privatization of the
postal system and the general
thrust for reforms to further 
liberalize the economy will
contribute to creating a
stronger Japanese economy
that will offer new and
expanded opportunities for
American business. 
It is also important not to
entertain excessive expecta-
tions (or apprehensions) about
Japan’s security policy. There 
is a cautious search for a some-
what expanded role for Japan
in international political and
security affairs, and that will
continue. But radical changes
are neither likely nor desirable.
The constraints on Japanese
foreign policy that derive from
the public opinion in Japan and
the difficulties of Japan’s rela-
tions with its closest neighbors,
China and Korea, remain
strong. In considering our secu-
rity relations with Japan, it is
important to understand that
they do not occur in isolation.
What happens in our relations
with Japan impacts directly on
our relations with China, South
Korea, and other countries. The
United States needs to have a
regional security strategy and 
to avoid thinking in purely
bilateral terms. In that context,
it is in American national inter-
ests to see Japan and China
improve their political relation-
ship. It is not in our interests
for relations between these
major powers to deteriorate 
further. Prime Minister Koizumi
has stressed that he believes 
it is important for Japan and
China to have good relations
and that he is looking for ways
to improve them. 
In that regard, however, a
looming issue is whether or not
Prime Minister Koizumi decides
to visit Yasukuni Shrine again.
Yasukuni is not simply a shrine
to honor the young men who
fought and died for their coun-
try. As a visit to the war museum
at the shrine makes all too
obvious, Yasukuni is a shrine
that honors the ideology and
the policies of the government
that sent these young men to
the battlefields of Asia and the
Pacific. It endorses the view
that the attack on Pearl Harbor
was a preemptive attack taken
in self-defense and Japanese
aggression in Asia was in fact a
noble endeavor to liberate Asia
from Western imperialism and
colonialism. Those convicted 
of Class A war crimes are
enshrined at Yasukuni, but 
that is only a symbol, not the
essence of the problem that has
made Yasukuni an international
It is in American
national interests





controversy. A decision by
Prime Minister Koizumi not to
go to Yasukuni will not neces-
sarily result in an improvement
of Sino-Japanese relations, but
it is a necessary condition for
improving those relations.
Japan is a dynamic political
democracy with a current,
immensely popular leader who
has significantly contributed to
making the U.S.-Japan relation-
ship stronger than it has ever
been. I think a lot of people are
excited about what is going on
in Japan. While you can’t see
exactly where things will go,
we know there is a new dynamic
version of the Japanese political
system that is more responsive
to public needs and public
desires. It is up to those who
are going to follow Mr. Koizumi
to actually find it. 
HUGH PATRICK
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business,
Columbia University
Professor Curtis suggested I make some comments 
on the economic implications
of Koizumi’s overwhelming 
victory. My problem is that he
is really a hard act to follow
and that he talked about all the
things I wanted to say about
economic reform. It was really
amazing to me that Koizumi
and the LDP campaign was
based solely on postal privati-
zation. That’s deeply important
to Koizumi, but as Gerry said, it
wasn’t to the public. It’s amaz-
ing how Koizumi skillfully made
this the lynch pin of his policy,
both as a symbol of and a pre-
condition for further economic
reform. I guess Koizumi was 
a vote for change, and the pub-
lic obviously wanted change 
no matter how poorly specified
it was. In fact, maybe it was
good that it wasn’t specified in
theory, because then the oppo-
sition couldn’t focus on that
particular aspect. 
Koizumi has not made out
his economic agenda clear or
complete at all. His victory
approved the reform of the
health care, public pensions,
central and local governments,
financial relationships, govern-
ment finances, and civil service
sectors. It was just yesterday
when Gerry told me he thinks
Koizumi will be using the 
coming months to define his
economic reform agenda and
will make its acceptance and
support a condition for whom-
ever the LDP elects as his
successor. And I also say that
this is how it will work out. My
guess is that in order to accom-
plish this, Koizumi will have to
extend his term for another year.
What reform will he push?
Postal privatization will obviously
become law. It is interesting
that it will be the same weak,
watered down law that was 
put to a vote before, however. 
I suppose Koizumi wants to
have it quickly approved to get
the symbolic benefit from it
and worry about cleaning up
that legislation later. Despite all
the weaknesses in this legisla-
tion, we have to expect that it
probably will have a very sig-
nificant effect on asset and
resource reallocation in Japan.
Privatization of Japan’s postal
sector is important because it is
the largest deposit-taking and
life insurance institution, and
there are lots of opportunities
for leakage and inefficiencies.
Postal savings deposits in
Japan totaled 214 trillion yen 
as of March of this year (about
$1.9 trillion), which is four-
fifths of the deposits of the 
four major banking groups
combined. Almost all of that is
invested in government bonds,
bills, and trust funds. Postal life
insurance assets totaled 120 tril-
lion yen (a little over a trillion
dollars), and they are almost
equal to the assets of the four
largest private Japanese life
insurance companies combined.
Therefore, just saying we are
going to privatize this doesn’t
say very much about how it 
is going to be worked out in
detail. In principle, it will create
greater efficiencies, but the
devil lies in the details, and the
details are not specified at all. 
It is going to take a very long
time—starting in 2007 and 
lasting ten years. During this
period, fighting over the details
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will occur and will thus be a
political and economic issue for
another year.
The first thing that will 
happen is the consolidation 
of financial institutions. There
will be a report coming out in
October on how they can be
consolidated, abolished, or cer-
tainly downsized. This will be
very important and will add
ammunition right away. Health
reform is another issue, and I
think the focus will be more on
the micro—the curing of the
efficiency of health care, imple-
menting better mechanisms for
sharing information on patients
electronically—rather than on
the macro issues of how the
costs of health care are going
to be covered. That’s always 
an ongoing issue. 
What issues are not likely to
be covered? My first thought is
agriculture. I was very interested
when Gerry brought that up as
a possible reform issue agenda.
It is strategically important in
Japan’s economic relations with
other Asian countries, because
it is a process of negotiating
bilateral, free trade agreements.
One of the big issues is that
Japan is very protectionist, so
that affects its ability to con-
structively negotiate with
virtually every other country.
Singapore is a nice little excep-
tion, in that it doesn’t have any
agricultural issues to be con-
cerned about. Forestry, fishing,
and health care are other big
issues. Health care is also a
highly protected industry in
Japan, and the recent Philippines
case allowed hundreds, not
thousands, of people to get visas.
The election has certainly
generated expectations about
Japan’s aging economic per-
formance, fueling what is
already a very good economic
recovery. However, I think it is
premature to categorically state
that the economy has broken
away from its mediocre cyclical
trap and is on the path to aiding
foreign growth. The develop-
ment and implementation of
economic reform policies is a
long process and should not be
considered a quick fix. Success-
ful reforms raised productivity,
particularly in the public sector.
Even so, I think the main effect
of this election is that a positive
attitude was finally spun. I think
the lesson in the last fifteen
years for businesses and house-
holds is that you couldn’t rely
on the government to fix the
private sector and that progress
would have to be based on its
own autonomous activity, rather
than government leadership. 
DISCUSSION
DAVID WEINSTEIN
Will the DPJ win an elec-tion in the next five or
ten years?
GERALD CURTIS
The DPJ has a long way to come back, obviously,
because they got slammed
down so badly, but I will just
repeat the point I made. Japan
is a country where nearly
everybody is a floating voter.
Party identification is much
lower there than it is in the
United States and any other
European country. It is a very
volatile electorate. As the DPJ
develops its younger leaders,
they may offer an alternative
that a lot of Japanese might find
attractive. Much depends on
what happens in the LDP. And
as I said, Koizumi has not cre-
ated a new LDP, he has created
the possibility that a new LDP
will emerge. But there are still 
a lot of old-fashioned, old-
school politicians in the LDP.
Can the DPJ go from 113 seats
to 241 four years from now? I
won’t take that bet, but it is not
impossible.
QUESTION
Could you say a little bitmore about the implica-
tions on foreign policy,
particularly with China, the
Yasukuni Shrine visit, this
incredible Koizumi landslide,
and what the DPJ might do in
terms of foreign policy issues?
GERALD CURTIS
Ithink Koizumi must be verytorn right now. My sense is
that he wants to try to improve
relations with China. Koizumi
is not an ideological right
winger on the Yasukuni Shrine
issue. Some LDP members visit
Yasukuni Shrine as an ideologi-
cal mission, and they make 
a point of saying they don’t
believe that Class-A war crimi-
Koizumi has not
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he has created 
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a new LDP 
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nals who were tried there were
criminals and they did any-
thing wrong. There are a lot of
LDP members who believe the
only thing Japan did wrong
was lose the war. But that’s not
Koizumi. For him, it’s purely
emotional; a lot of young peo-
ple died after being drafted
and sent to war. So, he has to
be torn about visiting Yasukuni
since he does not want to
exacerbate tensions with
China. At the same time, he
does not want to send a signal
to China that overt pressure
tactics are an effective way to
deal with Japan. So he is in
something of a dilemma, but it
is a dilemma he has created for
himself by his repeated visits
to Yasukuni Shrine. As far 
as the DPJ is concerned, the
new head of the DPJ is rather
conservative on foreign and
defense policy. What he is 
trying to say is that there is a
basic bipartisan view on for-
eign policy. I don’t think you
are going to see the DPJ mak-
ing a big issue over fundamen-
tal foreign policy orientations
and alliance with the United
States. He’ll instead focus 
his debates more on specific
foreign policy issues, which
would be very healthy,
because that’s what has been
missing.
QUESTION
Under Koizumi, many people have suggested
the LDP factions have been
destroyed. There’s one theory
that says Japan’s policy process
is now centered more around
the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet, and that bureaucracy
is weaker. However, as the
power of party leaders decline,
there’s also the thought that
bureaucracy, in particular the
Finance Ministry, actually has a
stronger influence over policy.
Where do you see the balance
among these different players,
and how will it evolve once
Koizumi leaves the scene? 
GERALD CURTIS
Policy making has clearlyshifted from the LDP to
the Prime Minister’s office. 
The role of party officials and
institutions in the policy-making
process has been radically
reduced. Japan has a rather
unique parliamentary system.
In the past, the party consid-
ered itself an equal to the gov-
ernment, a tradition that goes
back to before the war. Joint
government-ruling party con-
sultative committees are a reg-
ular feature of Japanese policy
making, something very differ-
ent from, for example, Britain’s
Cabinet and Prime Ministerial-
centered, decision-making
process. 
What Koizumi has done, 
or what he is trying to do, is to
turn Japan into a more British,
or Westminster-style democracy.
That’s where the Blair compari-
son comes in. When the Labour
Party takes control of the gov-
ernment, its leaders enter gov-
ernment; party officials are not
powerful in the policy process.
The power is in the Cabinet
and with the Prime Minister.
Koizumi is moving things 
in that direction. He decides 
who is in the Cabinet, and he
chooses people that he likes,
regardless of their factional
affiliation. 
The transformation is still
incomplete. Vice Ministers and
Parliamentary Secretaries are
appointed on the basis of fac-
tional affiliation and the num-
ber of times elected; it is the
old system where if you are
elected five times, you became
a Minister, or if you are elected
three times you become a
Parliamentary Secretary. Each
faction gets its proportion of
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seats. Koizumi said he is going
to quit next year, and one
thing he is going to do is 
identify those people who he
thinks have the potential to
rise to the top leadership posi-
tions and give them responsi-
bility in the coming Cabinet so
they can get some experience
and show the public how good
they are. In any case, there 
has been a general shift in the
center of gravity into the Prime
Minister’s office. 
I think Koizumi has done a
pretty good job in exercising
the power of the Prime Minister’s
office over the bureaucracy. 
I don’t find any truth in that
Finance Ministry is stronger
than ever. It’s not so strong.
Koizumi uses them. He agrees
with a lot of what Finance
Ministry bureaucrats tell him,
and he disagrees with some 
of it. So, I think there is much
more control over bureaucratic
establishment and reform, and
in these coming months, when
Koizumi talks about disman-
tling some of these public
financial institutions, you will
see he’s really interested in
getting rid of these places
where these bureaucrats can
parachute down to, breaking
the back of this bureaucratic
power. I think he is serious
about it.
That raises an important
question for the future of
Japanese politics. In the past,
the Diet has been a rubber
stamp in Japanese political
democracy. The decisions were
made within the LDP party, the
negotiations between the LDP
and the government, and some
decisions were raised and
brought to the Diet. The oppo-
sition opposed for opposition’s
sake, and if the party is not
playing a central role any
longer and things are centered
in the Prime Minister’s resi-
dence, the question is whether
the Diet then actually becomes
a place where a negotiation
can take place with the oppo-
sition. I think there is some
sign that it may be moving in
that direction, but it is very slow.
QUESTION
Can you talk more abouthow postal privatization
came to be the lynch pin in 
all this? The standard analysis
among those in the financial
sector is that this could have far
reaching complications for the
financial system. Do you think
Koizumi was more interested in
dismantling the political system
or sincere in his wishes for eco-
nomic reform?  
GERALD CURTIS
The issue of the postal sys-tem’s reform goes back
more than two decades for
Koizumi. He has focused on
this issue for most of his career,
and he is a believer that getting
the post office out of the busi-
ness of controlling so much
money or deposits in Japan
was essential for two things.
First, it was to make the econ-
omy more market responsive,
and second, to change the LDP
into a more modern party.
There are a lot of myths about
how powerful the post office 
is politically, but that’s mostly 
a myth, only making it good
copy in magazines and news-
papers. One reason the post
office was able to bring about
this reform is that politicians
don’t depend on the postmas-
ters as they used to. In the old
days, rural communities without
TVs had little communication
with the outside world. The
postmaster was a source of
information and a pipe to the
center and thus carried a lot of
weight in these rural districts.
That’s not rural Japan today.
Rural Japan, in fact, is not all
that different from urban Japan
in terms of people’s values.
Their concern is not all that 
different from people who live
in urban Japan. Why Koizumi
chose to focus on this issue 
so early on in his career, I’m
not certain. However, he is
absolutely passionate in his
belief that you cannot have
economic reform when this
huge financial institution is
under control of the govern-
ment and is nonresponsive to
market pressure. That’s what
drove him. The other issue that
he’s always been concerned
about has been fiscal reform,
but he won’t accomplish much
there.
There has been a
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